Genocide's Handmaiden. I heard on the radio, just a few minutes ago, that Richard A. Clarke delivered a "blistering" attack on George Bush on
60 Minutes last night. Checking the CBS website, it would appear that Clarke is being portrayed as a Republican appointee: "Clarke helped shape U.S. policy on terrorism under President Reagan and the first President Bush. He was held over by President Clinton to be his terrorism czar, then held over again by the current President Bush." In fact, Clarke is a life-long careerist, having started in the Pentagon in 1973 and worked up to SES status. In the words of Samantha Power, he was known as "one of the most effective bureaucrats in Washington."
And as Ms. Power clearly demonstrates in her
September 2001 Atlantic article, Mr. Clarke was the bureaucrat who completely shut down any U.S. assistance in Rwanda 10 years ago, leading to the Hutu massacre of "800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu" in a matter of weeks." Ms. Power's documents, time and again, Clarke's hand at shutting down even minimal efforts and forstalling or slowing the genocide:
Donald Steinberg managed the Africa portfolio at the NSC and tried to look out for the dying Rwandans, but he was not an experienced infighter and, colleagues say, he "never won a single argument" with Clarke.
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On April 15 [Secretary of State Warren] Christopher sent one of the most forceful documents to be produced in the entire three months of the genocide to Madeleine Albright at the UN—a cable instructing her to demand a full UN withdrawal. The cable, which was heavily influenced by Richard Clarke at the NSC, and which bypassed Donald Steinberg and was never seen by Anthony Lake, was unequivocal about the next steps. Saying that he had "fully" taken into account the "humanitarian reasons put forth for retention of UNAMIR elements in Rwanda," Christopher wrote that there was "insufficient justification" to retain a UN presence.
The international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible ... We will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda ... Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm. It is based on our conviction that the Security Council has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations are viable, that they are capable of fulfilling their mandates, and that UN peacekeeping personnel are not placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.
"Once we knew the Belgians were leaving, we were left with a rump mission incapable of doing anything to help people," Clarke remembers. "They were doing nothing to stop the killings."
But Clarke underestimated the deterrent effect that Dallaire's very few peacekeepers were having. Although some soldiers hunkered down, terrified, others scoured Kigali, rescuing Tutsi, and later established defensive positions in the city, opening their doors to the fortunate Tutsi who made it through roadblocks to reach them. One Senegalese captain saved a hundred or so lives single-handedly. Some 25,000 Rwandans eventually assembled at positions manned by UNAMIR personnel. The Hutu were generally reluctant to massacre large groups of Tutsi if foreigners (armed or unarmed) were present. It did not take many UN soldiers to dissuade the Hutu from attacking. At the Hotel des Mille Collines ten peacekeepers and four UN military observers helped to protect the several hundred civilians sheltered there for the duration of the crisis. About 10,000 Rwandans gathered at the Amohoro Stadium under light UN cover. Brent Beardsley, Dallaire's executive assistant, remembers, "If there was any determined resistance at close quarters, the government guys tended to back off." Kevin Aiston, the Rwanda desk officer at the State Department, was keeping track of Rwandan civilians under UN protection. When Prudence Bushnell told him of the U.S. decision to demand a UNAMIR withdrawal, he turned pale. "We can't," he said. Bushnell replied, "The train has already left the station."
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What about the other officials involved in Washington's Rwanda policy—how do they view their performance in retrospect? Today they have three main options.
They can defend the U.S. policy. This is the position of Richard Clarke, who believes, all things considered, that he and his colleagues did everything they could and should have done. "Would I have done the same thing again?" Clarke asks. "Absolutely. . . . I don't think we should be embarrassed. I think everyone else should be embarrassed by what they did, or did not do."
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Perhaps Richard Clarke is correct in attacking George Bush -- that should be explored and developed -- nevertheless, it should be remembered that Clarke, the consummate bureaucrat, is very effective at protecting and advancing Clarke at all costs.
It also must never be forgotten that Richard A. Clarke will forever be known as the handmaiden of the Rwanda genocide.
See also,
this profile from the WaPo from 2000.
And
this response from Condoleezza Rice.
Still More: See also
this essay by
George Smith from last Feb. 17 2003, setting forth still more of Clarke's mishaps.