Pledging Allegiance. Two judges on the 9th Circuit Court,
one,
an elderly Nixon appointee, one, a Carter appointee (and the bete noir of the conservatives) today determined that the 1954 amendment, which held the words "under God" to the national Pledge of Allegiance to be an unconstitutional Establishment of Religion.
There were four parts to this decision, the first three were not surprising or controversial. In part A, the Court rejected Newdow's (the litigant) request to compel the President and Congress to amend the Pledge of Allegiance to strike the words "under God" from the Pledge. In part B, the Court said that it would not address Newdow's request to strike down the California Statute mandating in the Pledge in the schools, because the state of California was not a party. In part C, the court said that Newdow, as a parent of a child in a particular school district had
standing to challenge that district's policy. It further said that he did not have standing to challege a policy of a different school district where his child was not a current student.
In Part D of the 9th Circuit determined that "in the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United States is a nation 'under God' is an endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism." After a review of the Supreme Court's recent Establishment clause jurisprudence, the two judges on the 9th circuit held that "the 1954 Act adding the words 'under God' to the Pledge . . . violate[s] the Establishment Clause."
To refresh everyone's recollection, the "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." A review of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the past 20 years or so shows that it has built an edifice of case law that is so far askew of the plumb line of the establishment clause that it was bound to collapse, and this could bring it down. A review of the 9th Circuit decision shows that it has been built on those great errors. Specifically, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Court struck down an Alabama statute that authorized a one-minute period of silence in public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer." In Lee v. Weisman, 505 the Court banned a non-sectarian invocation offered at a high school graduation 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Finally, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), the court prohibited student initiated and led prayer before an extra-curricular school event. Each of these interpretations is a clear departure from the touchstone of the constitution.
This is not an establishment of religion. It is time for the Court to strip down the crust that has built up over the past twenty years and get back to first principles. The first question that should be asked is whether the action of Congress or the state has the effect of establishing a religion. Does this create an institution like the established church in England? If not, that doesn't necessarily mean the legislature can, say, require students to recite the Pledge. That issue was effectively addressed by the Supreme Court in the Barnette 319 U.S. 624 case (overruling the earlier Gobitis decision) in which the Court stated:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." at 642.
Back in 1952, Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court observed:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that, in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other -- hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals [p*313] to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths -- these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God save the United States and this Honorable Court."
Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306 (1952) In that case, Justice Douglas went on to write:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction.
Justice Douglas is widely perceived as a judicial liberal -- I recall attending a lecture by Notre Dame Law Professor where he referred to him as William ZERO Douglas -- yet, his liberalism could be (and generally was) grounded in the constitution (he was very wrong in his Yoder dissent). I would like to see today's judicial liberals return to that type of constitutional fidelity.
For further research: The judge who wrote the majority opinion, also was on the committee that
issued this church report.